Major Philip Stokes’ Libya Military Report August 1941
2/3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
Lessons & Reports
March to August 1941
War Diary file AWM52 4/11/2/12 – [Unit War Diaries, 1939-45 War] 3 Australian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, March – August 1941 appendices
AWM2019.366.1439
8 AUST. LT. A.A. BTY.
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
COPY No. 4.
Based on experiences in action in Libya during six months ending 31 Aug. 1941.
INTRODUCTION
The Battery was first in action at Tobruk on 17th Feb. 1941, one week after arrival, manning three 20‑mm A.A. guns. Since that date, static defence has been carried out by detachments at MAGRUM, BENGASI, BARCE, DERNA, EL ADAM, GAMBUT and TOBRUK, covering supply depots, harbours, many types of aerodromes, field-gun areas, and in addition, protection was afforded convoys, L’s of C, bridges, defiles, etc. during the withdrawal from Bengasi. Much of the information gained from these operations has already been promulgated, but is again set out primarily for completeness, and secondly to show that many things are still acceptable in the light of later experience.
OPERATIONS
Mobile
Tasks.
Whilst it must be generally accepted that the 40‑mm Bofors A.A. gun is the ideal weapon for nearly every Light A.A. task, it is generally recognized that in protecting a convoy on the move it has the serious disadvantage of having to be jacked into action if the convoy is attacked. The posting of sufficient working numbers on the gun in transit and firing off the wheels is most unsatisfactory according to reports of the 1st. Lt. A. A. Bty, based on their experiences both in France and Libya. In this respect the inclusion in the Battery Establishment of four 20mm guns, mobile and capable of being fired from the floor of a vehicle is recommended. Experiments carried out using a firm hold-fast capable of being quickly released and a wider vehicle tray accommodating a crew of six have been highly successful and the idea has also been extended by providing such trucks with a collapsible canvas framework which whilst allowing of instant action gives the outward appearance of being an ordinary transport vehicle. A gun was similarly mounted on a flat railway truck for protection of the train operating between Bengasi and Solluch. The inclusion of such weapons in the establishment would give not only a greater firepower to the Battery but would enable it to meet all contingencies particularly as a support 5to a section of Bofors sited in an isolated position as well as affording own local protection when not deployed in action.
Siting.
The siting of mobile A.A. guns remains purely a question of local ground conditions, and no hard and fast rules can be laid down. But whilst on the move in desert country, guns can travel 300 to 500 yards on the flanks of a column parallel with it.
- Static.
Tasks.
Light A.A. tasks are many, and it can almost be stated that wherever an enemy aircraft can be expected to operate, there is a task for light guns. It must be understood, however, that the textbook axiom, that the main function of Light A.A. is to shoot down enemy planes, tends to create a wrong impression. The formation of Light A. A. is to provide protection and any deviation to tally shooting will fail in that task. A. A. guns protecting a W. P. should not engage dive bombers when they flatten out after dropping their loads even though they do the present the best target. If this is done then their bombing will be uncomfortably accurate. They should be engaged before they release their bombs and one after the other irrespective of whether they are good targets until every plane has dropped its bombs – and if the A. A. protection is good the pilots will be forced away from their line. There will always be more planes than guns and the No. 1 who chooses a particular target is allowing the others to operate as they please. If a direct attack on the V.P. is obvious, fire cannot be opened too soon, irrespective of range once the planes are committed to their dive. This does not apply to guns not sited for protection of a definite V.P.. Guns emplaced farther from the objective can engage planes as they go away.
Siting.
The siting of Light A.A. for most tasks is still mainly a matter of geometry and geography. Guns should always be sited in pairs so that they will be self-supporting. But in this respect where heavy dive raids may be expected, more is required. Cases have often been observed of planes diving on V.P’s from as many as three or four directions at once and under present establishment only quick-wittedness and the use of several spotters can cope with this form of attack. The provision of one L.M.G. for each light gun to be set up and manned some 50 yards away purely for the protection of the A.A. gun and crews, appears an absolute necessity during heavy raids and would also be available for engagement of ground troops.
Commanders should be careful when siting guns, particularly under the dusty conditions that exist in the M. E., that they first discover the direction of the prevailing wind. If this is not done, they may find the V.P. and targets obscured by the clouds of dust thrown up by bomb explosions during an action. The A. A. protection of field gun areas must be treated in two phases:
(a) Where one or more field troops occupy and shoot from the same position and are more or less isolated, guns can be sited as normally for a V.P.
(b) Where several Batteries are more or less concentrated in one area with alternate and sniping positions it becomes impossible to treat each Troop as a V.P. and the whole must be treated as a V.A.
The layout then becomes geometric as governed by topography and where a selection of two positions is available subject to those conditions, that which will give the better protection to an adjacent Troop should be selected.
ROLE
Protection of F.D.L.’s.
It is not considered that employing A.A. units in F.D.L.’s is justified. Economy of force dictates to the enemy the use of his artillery rather than dive bombers on targets within range of the former. In static or semi-static positions therefor deployment of a Lt. A.A. unit in forward areas would possibly be at the expense of our own field-gun areas, although probably within enemy artillery range, are more likely to be the target for a dive-bombing attack. It is agreed, however, that a mobile weapon similar to the 20‑mm Breda should be part of the infantry establishment.
Protection Against A.F.V.’s.
While the Light A.A. gun is capable of being used against such targets and the description “dual‑purpose” has suited the manufacturer, its use in such a task must be considered very secondary, in fact, economy alone dictates the purely primary role and engagement of tanks and A.F.V.’s should only be considered in the light of self‑protection or in extreme emergency. Further, under desert conditions, the dust raised by blast at low angles of elevation obscures the target after the first burst.
EMPLACEMENTS
Where possible, emplacements should be sunk below ground level and be of irregular outline. Not only is the shadow effect practically neutralised but the protection from blast is more effective. In addition, concealment from ground observation is increased, and camouflage comparatively simple. Where emplacements are constructed above the surface, great care should be exercised that the outer walls have a long, gradual slope.
CAMOUFLAGE
Camouflage depends on adequate training, time, and materials available for its effectiveness. However, the question of the provision of a portable and collapsible camouflage framework easily erected and dismantled should be carefully considered. Experiments have been made in this regard, and plans and specifications have been submitted to C.H.G.
Concealment on the other hand is capable of being obtained by several methods with various aids. The use of alternate positions, particularly in heavily shelled areas, has been of great advantage. Dummy positions are of inestimable value, but great care must be taken that such positions are visited each day to ensure they do not acquire a derelict appearance. However, dummy positions should not be sited near Field Gun or Hvy. A.A. sites which are active – even though a Lt. A. A. gun has been removed there from.
PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL
Providing the gun emplacement is soundly constructed, also the crew’s dugouts which should be of the two-man type and slightly dispersed, there is no necessity for a slit trench. The presence of a slit trench more often than not results in the development of a “rabbit complex”.” Offensive action is the surest protection and take little education to realise this. This is exemplified by the remarkable fact that notwithstanding heavy dive bombing and machine gunning attacks this Battery has suffered no casualties to date from air attack, although vehicles 300–500 yards away have been completely destroyed. As a further illustration in a recent attack on Tobruk, individual raids with an equal number of planes were made on four Battery sites – two active and two dummy. Both dummy sites suffered direct hits on gun emplacements, the others received only near misses.
GENERAL
Communication.
The provision of an adequate system of communication within the L.A.A. Bty. has long been the Battery Commander’s bugbear. Whilst in theory, the Regimental Signal Section, consisting of an officer and 32 O.R.s, equipped with 20 phones, 46 miles of cable and 2 exchanges would appear to be generous, in actual practice it is not. In the case of our Regiment, two Batteries were detached on separate assignments whilst the third, with Regimental HQ was left to be catered for by the Sig. Sec. This leaves two Batteries in the field with no signal section, no cable and two telephones each. Experience has taught that the result is not pleasant.
Although it may sound ambitious, the solution would appear to be a self-contained signal section within the Bty. The personnel for this Section are already on establishment in the shape of excess telephonists. The necessary increase in G1098 stores would probably include a 6 or10 line exchange, an additional 15 telephones and 15/20 miles of cable with a cable laying device. Line communications when static become of the utmost importance and usually cannot be catered for by the commanding unit.
In addition, and of the utmost importance, is the provision of 5 or 6 No. 11 W/T sets on the scale of 2 per Bty., H.Q.’s (Advanced and Rear) and one for each Troop with a spare. Notwithstanding an admittedly generous D.N. establishment, mobile operations without W/T become sluggish and inefficient compared with what they should be.
Administration.
The Troop is the fighting unit in Lt. A.A. If Middle East operations are any indication, all necessary administration can be carried out by the B.H.Q. who could deal directly with Brigade.
To this end B.H.Q. requires on establishment an office van so that it can efficiently carry put its duties.
The inclusion on B.H.Q. of a subaltern to act as liaison officer cum intelligence officer, cum adjutant, would then be justified. This naturally presumes the dispensation of a Regtl. H.Q. and with its own signallers and a small W/Shop section attached to the Battery would be self-contained.
Supply:
In mobile warfare the Light A.A. fighting unit (the Troop) should be rationed by the unit it is supporting or under the command of. To this end, the Bty. Captain should be able to place under command of that Units B Echelon a percentage of his vehicles. Under present establishment, he has no B vehicles to spare for the task. Nor can the Troop make available any of its vehicles, as under the very active conditions that prevail in modern warfare it becomes increasingly dangerous to remove any vehicles that may be required at an instant’s notice. The inclusion on B.H.Q. establishment of three more vehicles of the 5-ton class should solve this problem.
Medical:
Whilst provision is made in Lt. A.A. establishment for the training in first aid of men within the Battery, no provision is made for medical supplies and equipment. In this respect it is suggested that a medical pannier should be allowed for B.H.Q. and each T.H.Q. and adequate first aid outfits for each gun crew. Field and shell dressings are not sufficient for this purpose. The possibility of positions being cut off due to attack by parachute troops also provides a factor.
Training:
Light A.A. is one of the very few branches of modern warfare where an individual gun crew may, as a matter of course, find itself detached from any H.Q. for what might be a considerable period. It becomes necessary, therefore, that Lt. A.A. training should be intensely personal and should aim at building up a keen sense of responsibility. Before taking his men into action, a B.C. should be sure that each gun crew knows how to handle and cook rations that are of necessity somewhat monotonous, that it understands the principles of camouflage in all its aspects, and that every man is healthy in both mind and body. Morale of men under desert conditions depends to a certain extent on how they live and if they are properly trained in what difficulties they must expect and how to overcome those difficulties they will soon learn to live happily under conditions that would normally strain them to breaking point. It must be stressed that in Light A.A., such things as P.A.D. camouflage, the building of gun emplacements and dugouts and cooking are not subjects reserved for the specialist, but are problems for each and every individual.
Transport:
Motor Cycles:
It is difficult to understand why the provision of motor cycles as a mode of transport for Troop Officers is still laid down. The picture of a T.C. stranded in the desert with a broken-down motor cycle and minus batman, rations, personal gear, etc. is hardly a pleasant one. Under static conditions with good roads and plenty of alternative methods of transport available, a motor cycle would be an asset. In mobile desert warfare it is definitely a liability. An 8- or 12-cwt utility truck would be of far more advantage, enabling all contingencies of transport to be met.
Chev, 1-ton Van O.S.:
Whilst admittedly a handy utility vehicle, it is found that the springing is too light for desert conditions, causing numerous breakdowns. Fifteen new springs were fitted to 7 such trucks in the course approximately two months, and this notwithstanding, most of the work being done in low gear and due care exercised.
Engine Wear:
Although the 3-ton vehicle has generally stood up to desert conditions, it has been particularly noticeable that engines not fitted with an oil filter on the intake to the carburettor have deteriorated quickly, notwithstanding constant cleaning of the dry filter.
Establishment
The gunner allocated to B.H.Q. for butchery duties should be classified as a butcher trade group III. N.C.O.s should be increased in scale to allow the issue of one per A.A. gun.
P.A.D.
It is becoming more apparent that A.A. Commanders when deployed for the protection of V.A.’s in particular, landing grounds, Field Gun Areas, and H.Q.’s are loath to interfere, even offering suggestions, in cases where P.A.D. measures are either not or are poorly carried out by units so protected. It is considered the A.A. Commander should have full authority for directing passive as well as active defence.
Liaison:
Too much stress cannot be laid on the necessity for complete liaison between A.A. units and those units being afforded protection by them. In particular is this most important when protecting Field Gun Areas owing to the likelihood of movement by Field Troops to alternative or other positions. A.A. Troop or Battery Commanders must know the situation of the alternative position for the Field Guns so that the necessary reconnaissance and in some cases preparation of the Lt. A. A. sites may be completed against the contingency of a move. If this is not done, the consequent delay in siting and preparing the L.A.A. positions will leave the Field Guns without protection for a considerable time.
Equipment:
This Battery has been mostly equipped with 20-mm Breda guns, and experience with regard to this equipment has been varied:
- When first equipped with Breda guns, they were deployed in the following areas:
(a) 4 at Derna
(b) 6 at Barce
(c) 14 at Bengasi
and from these positions naturally the guns were practically free from sand and dust, and stoppages were reduced to a minimum due to the following points:
- By the fact that new trays obtained from Italian Ordnance Stores at Bengasi were used.
- That a fairly plentiful supply of Breda oil was obtainable.
- That the majority of guns, if not new, had been salvaged complete.
- That owing to the spasmodic raids which mostly took place at night a very complete maintenance could be carried out.
- Further, great care was exercised in extracting exploded cartridge cases and experiments carried out:
(a) With dry trays and ammunition,
(b) With well oiled trays and ammunition,
(c) Trays and ammunition merely wiped over with a very lightly oiled waste.
Of these, it was found that the first and last methods were most effective, but in most cases, plenty of oil was splashed into the working parts immediately preceding an action thus giving sufficient lubrication for the period of engagement.
During this time from 4 March to 2 April stoppages were almost entirely eliminated, and the performance of the guns high, the majority being adjusted to give a rate of fire of 220 rounds per minute (in some cases slightly more) and crews were very satisfied with its efficiency and simplicity and considered that the lack of weight of the projectile was offset by the rate of fire and the speed with which opening fire could be brought to bear.
- On the 24th March, the Detachment from Barce took over three guns at Bengasi with which they proceeded to Magrum. As this was a particular enterprise such guns taken over were completely dissembled, cleaned, assembled and tested and undoubtedly gave an excellent performance but on their first engagement at Magrum, two of them went out of action, one failing to fire, the other stopping after a few rounds and this despite consistent cleaning under cover of tarpaulins and it is certain that the stoppages were caused by the sand and dust which were very prevalent in that area.
- During the retirement, the guns performed reasonably, but stoppages began to occur, and were put down to:
(a) Dirt
(b) Insufficient cleaning tools
(c) Lack of proper maintenance due to movement
- Since deployment in the Tobruk garrison area, stoppages have been most frequent despite constant cleaning and attention all due to various causes which are set down as follows:
(a) Constant dust and sand storms. (x)
(b) Lack of correct oil. (x)
(c) Faulty trays in which ammunition is loose, owing to cartridges having been previously
extracted in an incorrect manner.
(d) Without knowledge of the previous history of the guns originally taken over by the
Battery, they have already fired an average of over 3,000 rounds per gun. (x)
(e) That certain other guns taken over in this area were “made up” from bits and pieces
of equipment and could not therefore give the performance of new guns or those
salvaged complete.
(f) Misfires have been prevalent, due mainly to worn strikers and recessed primers.
(g) Main springs have become fatigued. (x)
(h) Ammunition in some cases has not been gauged prior to loading, causing stoppages
due to enlarged projectiles.
General:
The equipment itself is notable for steadiness and handiness in action with regard to its caliber and weight, but a considerable amount of improvement could be made to the platform and undercarriage. There is no doubt that this Breda 20-mm is not a good weapon under desert conditions, whereas the Bofors undoubtedly is. This defect appears to be greatly due to the necessity for lubrication of the former causing the dust particles to adhere to the working parts of the gun. As against the poor quality of Italian ammunition in general, the three types of 20mm (ie H. E., A. P. and A. F.) explosive are fairly good, all types having an excellent tracer. The main fault found with a percentage of this ammunition is a softness in the rim causing the extractor to bite through leaving the cartridge case in the breech. Most prevalent in H. E. type of S. W. I. manufacture. older stocks of questionable manufacture. Other faults are recessed primers and faulty propellant charge. B.F.D. ammunition has been observed to give the best results.
Conclusion:
It is considered that the 20-mm Breda gun, as a new weapon with correct lubricating oil, full spare parts, tools, etc., and with a more mobile base structure would prove a most excellent anti‐aircraft weapon except under wider desert conditions. In particular is this true if it has to be used against tanks where unless mounted on a vehicle the crew is blinded by dust at low angles of elevation. While therefore admitting the superiority of the Bofors under desert conditions, it is not with a wish to detract the merits of the Breda as illustrated by comparisons set out hereunder, especially taking into consideration the respective time, materials, and resultant cost of manufacture. However, the greatest disadvantage is undoubtedly the smallness of the projectile, particularly against armour‐plated craft.
BREDA BOFORS
Muzzle Velocity 2,748 ft/sec 2,780 ft/sec
Rate of fire 220+ rds/min 120+ rds/min
Max. ground range 6,000 yds 9,000 yds
Max. vertical range 7,899 ft (approx.) 7,500 ft (approx.)
Weight of A.P. Shell 5 oz.
Weight of H.E. Shell 4 ¾ oz 2 lb 3 oz
Time for self-destruction of H.E. Shell 6 – 7 seconds 7 – 9 seconds
(This reduces max. vertical range of H.E. shell to between 7,250 ft and 7,575 ft.)
Notes:
(x) In this regard, the report of Italian H.Q. XXIII Corps Artillery to its dependent units on the faults of the 20-mm Breda gun is of interest:
- Breakages took place of the extractor box after about 2,500 rounds, and of the trigger spring and of the piston spring of the empty gun warning device after about 2,000 rounds. This H.Q. also summarizes the most frequent troubles experienced by these units with the 20-mm gun and its ammunition as follows:
(a) Faulty material and construction.
(b) Lack of lubrication, especially in the particular locality.
Of this equipment that issued before 1938, some had one single main spring whilst the later model No. 38 has a 3 piece spring held together by rings.
(Signed)
- Philip Stoke, Major,
O.C. 8 Aust. Lt. A.A. Bty.
In the Field: 16 Sep. 41
Distribution:
1 Aust. A.A. Bde. Copies No. 1–2
4 A.A. Bde. R.A. Copy No. 3
3 Aust. Lt. A.A. Regt. Copy No. 4
14 Lt. A.A. Regt., R.A. Copy No. 5
File. Copy No. 6